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Pharmaceutical Pricing When Success Has Many 
Parents 
Charles Silver & David A. Hyman† 
Pharmaceutical companies claim that high prices for drugs are needed to 
offset the costs and risks associated with research and development. In most 
instances, though, the initial (basic) research that leads to new discoveries is 
conducted at public institutions and paid for with public funds. Drugmakers 
tend to take over the process of bringing new drugs to market when the 
prospects for gaining regulatory approval seem good. 
Because the public helps cover the cost of research, many people believe 
that it pays twice for drugs—once when tax dollars support research and a 
second time when patients buy drugs for personal use. This Article takes a hard 
look at this “paying-twice” critique. We present case studies of two expensive 
drugs, Sovaldi and PrEP, that were developed with a combination of public 
and private support. We then survey the broader literature that attempts to 
quantify and assess the relative importance of both contributions. We then 
discuss the general problem of evaluating the importance of multiple 
contributions to productive activities in the absence of market-based 
allocations of the resulting revenue streams. Finally, we discuss the possibility 
of protecting consumers from high drug prices and deadweight losses by using 
prizes instead of patents to incentivize drug development. A prize regime would 
take the sting out of the paying-twice critique as well. 
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Introduction 
Count Caleazzo Ciano, the Italian diplomat and son-in-law of Mussolini, 
was the first to observe that “success has a hundred fathers.”1 Anyone who has 
worked hard on a team project and then seen others claim undeserved credit 
will understand what Count Ciano meant. 
When pharmaceutical companies bring new drugs to market, they 
invariably take credit for the discoveries and routinely charge thousands, tens 
of thousands, hundreds of thousands, or even millions of dollars for them. But 
in most instances, pharmaceutical companies are not solely responsible for the 
research and development that results in new drugs. The initial (basic) research 
is typically conducted at public institutions and paid for with public funds from 
the National Institutes of Health (NIH) or other public sources. For example, 
two new cancer drugs, Kymriah and Yescarta, were introduced in 2018. 
Kymriah cost $475,000 and Yescarta cost $373,000. Both drugs “grew out of 
research conducted and supported” by the NIH.2 Were Novartis and Kite 
Pharma, the companies that make them, claiming more credit than they were 
due? 
Many people seem to believe that pharmaceutical companies are 
overclaiming. In a representative op-ed from 2002 bearing the headline Paying 
Twice for the Same Drugs, two professors noted that “the American public 
pumps more than $20 billion a year in taxpayers funds into health-related 
research and development, making it the single largest investor in the 
pharmaceutical industry.”3 After observing that “[w]e’ve already paid for the 
 
1. “Success Has Many Parents,” PHRASE FINDER, 
https://www.phrases.org.uk/bulletin_board/59/messages/906.html. [https://perma.cc/YMC9-NG4B] A 
more accurate and more complete version of Count Ciano’s aphorism is: “victory finds a hundred 
fathers but defeat is an orphan.” At a 1961 press conference held in the wake of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, 
President John F. Kennedy ruefully recast Count Ciano’s quip, noting “there’s an old saying that victory 
has a hundred fathers and defeat is an orphan.” WILLIAM SAFIRE, SAFIRE’S POLITICAL DICTIONARY 
777-79 (2008); see also Origin of ‘No Jack Kennedy’ Comment Disputed, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 6, 
2007), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10785989. [https://perma.cc/HV7T-
PMP3] Over time, various commentators have re-framed “victory” into “success” and “father” into 
“parents.”  
2. Robert Pear, ‘Paying Twice’: A Push for Affordable Prices for Taxpayer-Funded 
Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/28/us/politics/drug-prices.html. 
[https://perma.cc/XXS6-8GS3] 
3. Peter Arno & Michael Davis, Paying Twice for the Same Drugs, WASH. POST (Mar. 
27, 2002), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2002/03/27/paying-twice-for-the-same-
drugs/c031aa41-caaf-450d-a95f-c072f6998931 [https://perma.cc/Q6DZ-BSAA] (arguing that the federal 
government should use its powers under the Bayh-Dole Act to make drugs more affordable); see also 
Peter S. Arno & Michael H. Davis, Why Don’t We Enforce Existing Drug Price Controls? The 
Unrecognized and Unenforced Reasonable Pricing Requirements Imposed Upon Patents Deriving in 
Whole or in Part from Federally Funded Research, 75 TULANE L. REV. 631 (2001) (same).  
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cost of research,” the authors ask “[w]hy []aren’t we seeing lower drug 
prices?”4 Many patient advocates similarly contend that the public “pays twice” 
for drugs—first when tax dollars pay for research and second when patients 
buy the drugs for personal use.5 
Are drug companies taking more credit than they deserve? How involved 
is the government in developing new drugs, and in what ways? How often are 
patients actually paying twice for their pharmaceuticals, and what does paying 
twice actually mean? Is paying twice a problem, and if it is, what should we do 
about it? To answer these questions, one must work through complicated 
factual, legal, and philosophical puzzles. In this Article, we lay out some basic 
facts and highlight these difficulties. 
In Part I, we document the prevalence of the “paying-twice” critique in the 
debate over pharmaceutical pricing. Part II presents case studies of two drug 
regimens (Sovaldi and PrEP), which help illustrate the diverse ways in which 
the government is involved in pharmaceutical R&D. Part II also reviews the 
empirical evidence on the role of government funding in the development of 
new drugs and medical devices. Part III provides a theoretical framework for 
analyzing the dynamics when two or more parties contribute to the creation of a 
valuable asset and discusses the possibility of using prizes instead of patents to 
incentivize drug development—thereby protecting consumers from high drug 
prices and deadweight losses. Finally, we offer a brief conclusion. 
I. The Paying-Twice Critique 
In the pharmaceutical context, the paying-twice critique surfaced during 
debates over the Bayh-Dole Act. Bayh-Dole was enacted in response to the 
perception that government-funded research was being commercialized too 
slowly—if at all.6 Bayh-Dole authorized nonprofit institutions (including 
colleges and universities) to retain ownership of inventions that resulted from 
government-funded research. The government retained a nonexclusive license 
for its own use and “march-in” rights under four specified circumstances.7 One 
of the four specified circumstances involves the failure to take “effective steps 
to achieve practical application of the subject invention”8—with practical 
application defined, in part, as requiring that the “benefits are, to the extent 
 
4. Id. 
5. See infra Section I.A. For a detailed discussion of the complexities of the paying-
twice critique, see Rebecca E. Wolitz, The Pay-Twice Critique, Government Funding, and Reasonable 
Pricing Clauses, 39 J. LEGAL MED. 177 (2019).  
6. WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32076, THE BAYH-DOLE ACT: 
SELECTED ISSUES IN PATENT POLICY AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF TECHNOLOGY 2 (2012). 
7. JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44597, MARCH-IN RIGHTS UNDER 
THE BAYH-DOLE ACT (2016). 
8. 35 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2018). 
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permitted by law or Government regulations, available to the public on 
reasonable terms.”9 
Bayh-Dole effectively privatized the rewards of research done by 
universities at public expense. That strategy was controversial from the Act’s 
development. Senator Russell Long expressed concerns on the Senate floor: 
There is . . . absolutely no reason why the taxpayer should be forced to subsidize 
a private monopoly and have to pay twice: First for the research and 
development and then through monopoly prices . . . . This proposed legislation is 
one of the more radical, far-reaching giveaways that I have seen in many 
years.10 
Subsequent evaluation of Bayh-Dole has highlighted this criticism.11 Other 
analysts have focused on the substantial increase in technology transfer by 
colleges and universities following the enactment of Bayh-Dole and have 
proclaimed the legislation a success on that basis.12 
In fairness, the paying-twice critique prompted the government to require 
“reasonable” pricing of products that relied on a subset of government-funded 
basic research from 1989 through 1995. More specifically, for products that 
resulted from Cooperative Research and Development Agreements between 
NIH and private parties, this policy required “a reasonable relationship between 
the pricing of a licensed product, the public investment in that product, and the 
health and safety needs of the public.”13 Six years later, the government 
abandoned the policy,14 despite the now-familiar criticism from Senator Ron 
Wyden that taxpayers would be “forced to pay twice for their medicines—
through their taxes and again at the pharmacy.”15 
 
9. 37 C.F.R. § 401.2(e) (2019); see also Steven Ezell, THE BAYH-DOLE ACT’S VITAL 
IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S. LIFE-SCIENCES INNOVATION SYSTEM, INFO., TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. 30 
(Mar. 2019), https://itif.org/sites/default/files/2019-bayh-dole-act.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2ZM-BRAX] 
(explaining that the NIH has never exercised its march-in rights, nor has any other federal agency).  
10. 126 CONG. REC. 8738-39 (1980) (statement of Sen. Long). 
11. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and 
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1666 (1996) (“[B]y 
allowing private firms to hold exclusive rights to inventions that have been generated at public expense, 
it [Bayh-Dole] seems to require the public to pay twice for the same invention-once through taxes to 
support the research that yielded the invention, and then again through higher monopoly prices and 
restricted supply when the invention reaches the market.”); Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, 
Bayh-Dole Beyond Borders, 4 J.L. BIOSCIENCES 1 (2017); Wolitz, supra note 5. 
12. SCHACHT, supra note 6, at 8. 
13. See Wolitz, supra note 5, at 193-98.  
14. Warren E. Leary, U.S. Gives Up Right to Control Drug Prices, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
12, 1995), https://www.nytimes.com/1995/04/12/us/us-gives-up-right-to-control-drug-
prices.html?mcubz=l [https://perma.cc/BK9C-VNPP]; see also NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, NIH 
RESPONSE TO THE CONFERENCE REPORT REQUEST FOR A PLAN TO ENSURE TAXPAYERS’ INTERESTS 
ARE PROTECTED 10 (2001), https://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/policy/wydenrpt.pdf 
(“Shortly after the policy of ‘reasonable pricing’ was introduced, industry objected to it, considering it a 
form of price control. Many companies withdrew from any further interaction with NIH because of this 
stipulation. Both NIH and its industry counterparts came to the realization that this policy had the effect 
of posing a barrier to expanded research relationships and, therefore, was contrary to the Bayh-Dole 
Act.”).  
15. Id.  
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The paying-twice critique has become quite common of late, appearing in 
statements by politicians,16 the executive director of Doctors Without 
Borders,17 opinion journalists, historians,18 and progressive economists.19 The 
policy implications of this critique are straightforward: we should stop paying 
twice. But how should we go about accomplishing that goal? 
Professors Peter Arno and Michael Davis argue that the solution “does not 
involve new legislation but already exists in the unused, unenforced march-in 
provision of the Bayh-Dole Act.”20 Senators Bayh and Dole have disputed the 
suggestion that the legislation bearing their names authorizes the imposition of 
pricing constraints on pharmaceuticals merely because drugs are expensive.21 
Although the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and NIH have 
had several opportunities to revisit the issue, to date they have sided with 
Senators Bayh and Dole,22 despite pressure from multiple members of 
Congress.23 
 
16. Wolitz, supra note 5, at 178 n.1 (referencing a tweet from Rep. Ocasio-Cortez 
complaining that “tax dollars are helping big pharma companies get rich.”); Bernie Sanders, Opinion, 
Bernie Sanders: Trump Should Avoid a Bad Zika Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/10/opinion/bernie-sanders-trump-should-avoid-a-bad-zika-deal.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y9KQ-NXNT] (“Under this insane system, Americans pay twice. First we pay to 
create these lifesaving drugs, then we pay high prices to buy those drugs.”). 
17. Jason Cone, Pharmaceutical Corporations Need to Stop Free-Riding on Publicly-
Funded Research, HILL (Mar. 3, 2018), https://thehill.com/opinion/healthcare/376574-pharmaceutical-
corporations-need-to-stop-free-riding-on-publicly-funded [https://perma.cc/H5WM-9MLS] 
18. Steven Conn, You’re Paying Twice for Your High-Priced Drugs, DAYTON DAILY 
NEWS (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.daytondailynews.com/news/opinion/commentary-you-paying-
twice-for-your-high-priced-drugs/4DWHU5PKRCuZMXRqIgPn2O [https://perma.cc/PVC2-NUUH] 
(“[T]he very technology that makes Humalog possible, and every other product manufactured through 
genetic engineering, was paid for by you, and not just if you were paying taxes back in 1973. The same 
could be said of almost every drug for which Big Pharma is gouging patients. The basic research, plus 
the FDA trials and approvals, have been publicly funded while the huge profits that have resulted have 
been entirely private . . . unless Congress acts to rein in these prices, we will all keep paying for our 
prescriptions twice over.”). 
19. Marianna Mazzucato, How Taxpayers Prop up Big Pharma, and How to Cap 
That, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2015), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-1027-mazzucato-big-
pharma-prices-20151027-story.html [https://perma.cc/M45Q-PQLT]  (“Everyone knows that Americans 
pay high prices for drugs. But there is more to this story. The taxpayer not only shells out at the 
pharmacy but often plays a critical role in funding these drugs in the first place. In other words, the 
public pays twice.”). 
20. Arno & Davis, Why Don’t We Enforce Existing Drug Price Controls?, supra note 
3, at 631. 
21. See Statement of Senator Birch Bay to the National Institutes of Health, in NAT’L 
INSTS. OF HEALTH, NIH PUBLIC MEETING ON NORVIR/RITONAVIR MARCH-IN REQUEST 2-4 (May 25, 
2004) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh), 
https://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2004NorvirMtg/
2004NorvirMtg.pdf[https://perma.cc/QK83-RL6F] (asserting that Bayh-Dole does not authorize the 
government to use its march-in rights to set reasonable drug prices, and that Arno & Davis had 
misrepresented the legislative history to argue to the contrary); Birch Bayh & Robert Dole, Our Law 
Helps Patients Get New Drugs Sooner, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2002, at A28.  
22. Wolitz, supra note 5, at 205; see also Letter from Sylvia Burwell, Sec’y, U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Sen. Lloyd Doggett, U.S. Congress (Mar. 2, 2016), 
http://freepdfhosting.com/be7532cfc0.pdf [https://perma.cc/DB6X-ZPGH] (declining the invitation to 
issue regulatory guidance on when HHS/NIH would assert its march-in rights, but noting that such rights 
are “strictly limited and can only be exercised if the agency conducts an investigation and determines 
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Are Americans actually paying twice for pharmaceuticals? In Part II, we 
examine the extent of government involvement in drug development, and in 
Part III, we provide a framework for analyzing the paying-twice critique and 
propose several strategies for addressing the underlying problem. 
II. Government Involvement in Drug Development 
We begin with case studies of two high-profile medications whose 
histories illustrate the complex interaction of public and private institutions 
during the drug-development process. We follow these case studies with a 
broader review of the literature. Both approaches highlight the difficulty of 
disentangling public and private contributions to pharmaceutical development. 
A. Case Studies 
1. Sovaldi 
As we have described in detail elsewhere, Sovaldi, a breakthrough 
treatment for hepatitis C, exemplifies the complexities of quantifying the risks 
that pharmaceutical companies bear and of determining whether those risks 
justify the prices that pharmaceutical companies demand.24 When Gilead 
Sciences (Gilead) introduced Sovaldi, it charged $84,000 for a course of 
treatment that required 84 pills, each of which cost about $1 to make.25 This 
staggeringly large difference between the list price and the manufacturing cost 
might well be justified, depending on the amount of risk the companies (in this 
case, Pharmasset and Gilead) incurred in the course of inventing the drug and 
bringing it to market. As we have noted previously: “[E]normous risks justify 
enormous rewards when ambitious undertakings succeed. If Pharmasset/Gilead 
took big risks by inventing and testing Sovaldi, then big rewards are warranted, 
just as they are when companies invent and bring to market other new products, 
like electric cars, smartphones, or flat screen TVs.”26 
Whether Pharmasset and Gilead actually incurred enormous risks is, 
however, an open question. At times, the public bore the risks associated with 
Sovaldi’s development because public funds helped pay for the research. For 
example, from 2000 to 2006, Pharmasset received NIH grants totaling 
 
that specific criteria are met, such as alleviating health or safety needs or when effective steps are not 
being taken to achieve practical application of the inventions”). 
23. Ed Silverman, NIH Asked to Fight Price Gouging by Overriding Drug Patents, 
STAT (Jan. 11, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/01/11/nih-drug-costs-patents 
[https://perma.cc/74X4-HFX9]. 
24. CHARLES M. SILVER & DAVID A. HYMAN, OVERCHARGED: WHY AMERICANS PAY 
TOO MUCH FOR HEALTH CARE 58 (2018).  
25. Richard Knox, $1,000 Pill for Hepatitis C Spurs Debate over Drug Prices, NPR, 
(Dec. 30, 2013), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2013/12/30/256885858/-1-000-pill-for-
hepatitis-c-spurs-debate-over-drug-prices [https://perma.cc/ZYR8-4QWF]. 
26. SILVER & HYMAN, supra note 24. 
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$2,460,171.27 Neither Pharmasset nor Gilead deserves credit for costs that 
taxpayers covered. 
Although $2.5 million over seven years isn’t chicken feed, publicly 
supported research on hepatitis C is far more extensive and far more 
longstanding, dating back to the 1990s with the development and 
commercialization of tools for testing antiviral compounds.28 Should we 
include those expenditures when counting the public’s contribution to the 
development of Sovaldi? In practice, all discoveries of new treatments take 
advantage of scientific knowledge and tools developed by others.29 Quantifying 
the public’s financial contribution to Sovaldi’s development requires deciding 
when the process of developing it started and what prior and contemporaneous 
research to include—a process that is both arbitrary and subjective. 
One approach is to include all public expenditures devoted to research on 
hepatitis C and other hepatitis-related matters. Although data limitations 
prevent us from developing a complete picture, from 2008 through 2014, NIH 
doled out $752 million for hepatitis-C research and over $2.6 billion for all 
forms of hepatitis research combined.30 But even if figures for years prior to 
2008 were available, the numbers alone would not show whether Pharmasset’s 
scientists benefitted from other researchers’ work—or if so, by how much. 
It is tempting to use Pharmasset’s founding in 1998 as the point after 
which a private entity began covering the costs and bearing the risks associated 
with developing Sovaldi. However, that approach might be overinclusive. 
Pharmasset first reported spending money on preclinical studies for PSI-7977 
(the molecule that became Sovaldi) in SEC filings in 2008.31 During the first 
decade of Pharmasset’s existence, the company was focused on other drug 
candidates. Research on those candidates may have helped with the study of 
PSI-7977, but again, the magnitude of the overlap cannot be assessed with 
precision. 
A report by the Senate Finance Committee states that “Pharmasset spent 
$62.4 million researching and developing PSI-7977” from 2008 to 2011.32 
Only a small fraction of these costs, less than $250,000, was covered by a 
 
27. See NIH Awards by Location & Organization, NIH RES. PORTFOLIO ONLINE 
REPORTING TOOLS (REPORT), https://report.nih.gov/award/index.cfm?ot=&fy=2000&state=&
ic=&fm=&orgid=3938601&distr=&rfa=&om=n&pid=#tab2 [https://perma.cc/G3HU-3R8U] (searching 
“PHARMASSET, INC.” as an organization for fiscal years 2000-2006 in the database).  
28. Victor Roy & Lawrence King, Betting on Hepatitis C: How Financial Speculation 
in Drug Development Influences Access to Medicines, BRIT. MED. J. 354, 354-59 (2016). 
29. For an example, see John D. Westbrook & Stephen K. Burley, How Structural 
Biologists and the Protein Data Bank Contributed to Recent FDA New Drug Approvals, 27 STRUCTURE 
211 (2019), which discusses the use of an open-access databank by drug innovators. 
30. See Estimates of Funding for Various Research, Condition, and Disease 
Categories (RCDC), NIH RES. PORTFOLIO ONLINE REPORTING TOOLS (REPORT) (Feb. 24, 2020), 
https://report.nih.gov/categorical_spending.aspx [https://perma.cc/5YWX-5H9J]. 
31. STAFF OF THE S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 114TH CONG., THE PRICE OF SOVALDI AND 
ITS IMPACT ON THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 13 (Comm. Print 2015).  
32. Id. 
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federal grant.33 Presumably, the latter figure reflects only public funds that 
were specifically tied to studying PSI-7977 rather than to all grants that 
Pharmasset may have received, and the former reflects private monies used for 
that purpose. However, for already explained reasons, these allocations may be 
arbitrary for determining how public and private support affected the risks 
associated with Sovaldi. Before focusing on PSI-7977, Pharmasset spent 
money on other candidate treatments for hepatitis C.34 If one conceptualizes the 
search for new drugs in terms of diseases targeted rather than molecules tested, 
then the cost of creating Sovaldi should include all money spent on candidates 
that did not pan out. 
So when should we start counting? By 2010, Pharmasset insiders had 
determined that PSI-7977 was “less risky than other drugs at this stage of 
development.”35 In 2011, they concluded a successful Phase 2 trial, received 
encouraging feedback from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and 
became the target of a bidding war among larger pharmaceutical companies. 
The war ended on November 21, 2011, when Gilead announced Pharmasset’s 
acquisition at a price of $11.2 billion. 
Interestingly, “many investors believed Gilead had overpaid, taking 
umbrage at the eighty-nine percent premium to Pharmasset’s stock price.”36 
The stock market agreed. Gilead’s shares fell nine percent the day of the 
announcement. But Gilead had the last laugh; “[i]n 2014, the first year that 
Gilead marketed Sovaldi and Harvoni,” a drug that combined Sovaldi with 
another ingredient, “the company reported $12.4 billion in worldwide HCV 
sales.”37 Gilead recouped the cost of buying Pharmasset in less than a year and 
reaped billions of dollars in profits thereafter. 
Pharmasset’s owners may have sold the company too cheaply, but they 
still enjoyed a spectacular return on their investment. Gilead’s acquisition of 
Pharmasset reflects the modern business model of large pharmaceutical 
companies, which tend to acquire promising molecules from smaller start-ups 
rather than doing the original, highly risky research themselves. “A 2014 study 
found that companies deemed to be ‘winners’”—the ten that consistently 
outperformed the average for the pharma sector—“earned more than 70% of 
their sales from products developed by other companies.”38 
 
33. Id. 
34. Merrill Goozner, Why Sovaldi Shouldn’t Cost $84,000, MOD. HEALTHCARE (May 
3, 2014), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20140503/MAGAZINE/305039983/why-sovaldi-
shouldn-t-cost-84-000 [https://perma.cc/5QES-AMH7]. 
35. STAFF OF THE S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 114TH CONG., supra note 31, at 13.  
36. Charley Grant, Deal Iron Too Hot for Gilead to Strike, WALL ST. J. (May 1, 
2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/deal-iron-too-hot-for-gilead-to-strike-1430496777 
[https://perma.cc/WUE8-FGK8]. 
37. Id. at 14. 
38. Roy & King, supra note 28, at 354-59 (citing Nils Behnke et al., New Paths to 
Value Creation for Pharma, BAIN & CO. (Sept. 24, 2014), https://www.bain.com/insights/new-paths-to-
value-creation-in-pharma [https://perma.cc/23YU-ARUX]).  
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Gilead was one of those companies. Over a 20-year period, its total annual 
shareholder return reportedly averaged about 22%.39 By comparison, the 
average for similarly sized pharmaceutical companies was about 9%.40 Gilead’s 
decision to acquire Pharmasset fit the business model that generated this 
performance. Commenting on the acquisition of Pharmasset in a 2015 earnings 
call, John Martin, Gilead’s CEO, reportedly stated: “We typically like things 
where we can have impact on phase III and where we can accelerate those 
products either into the approval process or into greater indications after the 
approval process.”41 Phase III, which follows discovery and development in the 
laboratory and preclinical research, is the stage for testing drugs’ safety and 
effectiveness on humans.42 
Gilead pegged the cost of bringing Sovaldi to market at $880 million (on 
top of the cost of acquiring Pharmasset), but this figure is almost certainly 
exaggerated. Before being acquired, Pharmasset estimated that the remaining 
cost to bring Sovaldi to market was $125.6 million. 
Even if Gilead’s figures are correct, the price it set for Sovaldi does not 
reflect the risks and costs incurred by the company. The Senate Finance 
Committee’s report on Sovaldi identifies the considerations that drove the 
decision to charge $1,000 per pill: 
Gilead considered a number of factors in determining a price point for Sovaldi, 
including costs for the existing standard of care for HCV treatment and setting a 
high baseline for the next wave of HCV drugs. In addition, during the pricing 
process, Gilead looked at a range of impacting factors to gauge the likelihood of 
various ‘‘softer issues’’ at different pricing points—ranging from professional 
societies including price ‘‘asterisks’’ in their therapy recommendations, to 
protests from the AIDS Health Foundation or Fair Pricing Coalition, to losing 
‘‘key opinion leader’’ endorsements, and even to the likelihood of congressional 
hearings or letters concerning the price of Sovaldi.43 
The factors mentioned in Gilead’s internal deliberations had nothing to do 
with the costs and risks the company incurred and everything to do with the 
price the market could bear. In its public statements, Gilead has tried to 
 
39. Behnke et al., supra note 38.  
40. Id. 
41. Roy & King, supra note 28, at 354-59. 
42. The Drug Development Process, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN (Jan. 4, 2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/patients/learn-about-drug-and-device-approvals/drug-development-process 
[https://perma.cc/KMA2-E3MS]. 
43. STAFF OF THE S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 114TH CONG., supra note 31, at 29. 
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emphasize Sovaldi’s “value”,44 even though value actually has little to do with 
the price at which goods and services change hands in competitive markets.45 
Gilead’s internal pricing calculus is unsurprising. Costs and risks matter 
ex ante—when drug companies are deciding whether to invest in research, to 
acquire other companies with promising products, and so forth—but they do 
not affect the prices pharmaceutical companies charge ex post, after the 
research is complete and FDA approval is secured. Then, rational businesses 
always charge as much as they can for their goods. That is how they maximize 
their profits or, when production costs exceed prices, minimize their losses. 
Pressure to keep prices low comes from external sources. Chief among 
them are competition from other suppliers and consumers’ willingness to pay. 
When it comes to name-brand drugs, however, neither matters much. Patents 
effectively confer a time-limited monopoly. Thus, when patented drugs lack 
close substitutes, the sky is the limit when it comes to pricing, particularly 
when third-party payers bear most of the costs. 
The question becomes how much money payers will part with and, as we 
explain in Overcharged, those payers often have little power to resist 
pharmaceutical companies’ demands.46 It is easy to see why prices for branded 
drugs like Sovaldi and Harvoni seem to defy gravity. 
Sovaldi and Harvoni also show some of the complications of 
disaggregating the relative contributions of public and private efforts to the 
development of new drugs. Depending on when one starts counting and what 
one counts, the degree of public contribution is either overwhelming or quite 
modest—and the extent to which taxpayers are paying twice varies, 
accordingly. 
2. Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP) Regime 
Gilead Sciences also makes Truvada, a treatment for HIV. Truvada 
combines two previously discovered antiretroviral drugs, emtricitabine (FTC) 
and tenofovir disoproxil fumarate (TDF), into a single pill. In 2004, the FDA 
approved Truvada as a treatment for HIV. When used for this purpose, Truvada 
reduces the amount of HIV in patients’ bloodstreams by preventing the virus 
from replicating. 
 
44. Innovating and Expanding Access to Hepatitis C Treatments, GILEAD SCIS. (Oct. 
2014), https://www.gilead.com/~/media/Files/pdfs/Policy-Perspectives/ExpandingAccesstoHCVTr
eatments10214.pdf [https://perma.cc/PH9U-HH9G] (“[T]he price of Gilead’s hepatitis C treatments 
reflects the significant clinical, economic and public health value that Sovaldi and Harvoni offer to 
patients, their families and healthcare systems, and is comparable to, or in many cases less than, the cost 
of older, less effective regimens.”). 
45. As we explain in Overcharged, “value” to the purchaser places a ceiling on the 
price that buyers will pay—but marginal cost actually drives prices in competitive markets. SILVER & 
HYMAN, supra note 24, at 56-57. The repeated invocation of “value” by Gilead and its apologists is a 
clumsy attempt to deflect attention from this reality. Id. 
46. Id. at 54. 
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Eight years later, the FDA approved Truvada in the same dosage form and 
strength as a Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP) regime. When used for this 
purpose, Truvada reduces the likelihood that the virus will gain a foothold in 
the body of a person who is not already infected. The estimated effectiveness of 
Truvada as PrEP is 99%. In 2019, Americans who purchased Truvada 
domestically paid about $2,000 a month for the drug.47 That is substantially 
more than the $1,200 the drug cost in 2012.48 And by comparison to the 
marginal cost of making the pills—about $0.2049—both prices are 
astonishingly high.50 
A chorus of voices, including advocates for the LGBTQ+ community and 
several U.S. Senators, have accused Gilead of profiting off research on the 
effectiveness of the FTC/TDF combination done by the Centers for Disease 
Control (CDC). Unlike the debate over Sovaldi, the dispute over PrEP has 
recently morphed into a legal battle. The CDC patented the use of FTC and 
 
47. Natalie Grover, Under Fire for Truvada US Pricing at House Hearing, Gilead 
Chief O’Day Touts R&D Costs, Asserts Governments Patents are Void, ENDPOINTS NEWS (May 17, 
2019), https://endpts.com/under-fire-for-truvada-us-pricing-at-house-hearing-gilead-chief-oday-touts-rd-
costs-asserts-governments-patents-are-void [https://perma.cc/956U-6A2R]. In other countries, generic 
versions sell for much less; for example, only about $250 per month in Canada and Mexico. Bobby Box, 
Why Is Prep So Inaccessible in Canada?, IN MAG. (June 18, 2019), http://inmagazine.ca/2019/06/why-
is-prep-so-inaccessible-in-canada [https://perma.cc/8A44-N4JC]; Mexico, First Latin American Country 
with AIDS Pills for Sale, MAZATLÁN POST (Apr. 7, 2019), 
https://themazatlanpost.com/2019/04/07/mexico-first-latin-american-country-with-aids-pills-for-sale 
[https://perma.cc/LE35-869H] ($4,599 pesos equaled about $250 in 2019). The Yale Global Health 
Justice Partnership reports that “pills . . . cost less than $6 per month abroad.” GHJP Joins PrEP4All in 
Calling on CDC to Use Its Patents for PrEP, YALE L. SCH. TODAY (Mar. 27, 2019), 
https://law.yale.edu/yls-today/news/ghjp-joins-prep4all-calling-cdc-use-its-patents-prep 
[https://perma.cc/NB3G-NKRT]. 
48. Tim Fitzsimons, Following Court Ruling, Generic Truvada Could Soon Be 
Available in U.K., NBC NEWS (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/following-
court-ruling-generic-truvada-could-soon-be-available-u-n911586 [https://perma.cc/HM7Z-NQDV]. 
49. Letter from Amy Kapczynski & Christopher Morten, Yale Global Health Justice 
Partnership, to Rep. Elijah Cummings & Rep. Jim Jordan, U.S. Congress, Re: May 16, 2019 Hearing on 
“HIV Prevention Drug: Billions in Corporate Profits after Millions in Taxpayer Investments” (May 16, 
2019), https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/ghjp/documents/2019.05.16_ghjp_letter_to_
house_oversight_committee_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PLD-8WKD]. 
50. Gilead has sought to distract attention from the total cost of Truvada by 
emphasizing the small amounts that insured patients pay out of pocket for the drug. See Gilead 
Statement on Petitions to US Patent and Trademark Office on HIV PrEP Patents, GILEAD SCIS. (Aug. 
21, 2019), https://www.gilead.com/news-and-press/company-statements/petitions-to-us-patent-and-
trademark-office-on-hiv-prep-patents [https://perma.cc/HD8V-4N4S] (“Today, a person with Medicare 
typically pays between $0 and $5 per month for Truvada for PrEP®; a person with Medicaid typically 
pays between $4 and $9 per month; and a person with insurance through an employer or private party 
typically pays between $0 and $35 per month.”).  
That same tactic has been used by many pharmaceutical companies, see SILVER & HYMAN, supra 
note 24, at 293, and by the Wall Street Journal’s editorial board in defending Gilead, The Editorial 
Board, Opinion, Trump’s Patent Trolls, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 15, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trumps-patent-trolls-11573777498 [https://perma.cc/7SRZ-WVKA] 
(noting that “Truvada has a list price of about $2,000 per month, though almost no one pays that,” that in 
2018 Gilead “covered the out-of-pocket costs for nearly 170,000 privately insured patients,” and that 
because the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force recently recommended adding Truvada to the menu of 
preventive services that insurers must provide subscribers without charge, “virtually everyone who 
wants Truvada in the U.S. will soon be able to get it for free”). 
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TDF for PrEP,51 and Gilead’s critics argued that it should have to obtain a 
license from the U.S. government.52 The government could condition granting 
that license on Gilead paying royalties or agreeing to lower Truvada’s price. 
Gilead, however, has no license. And the Department of Justice (DOJ) recently 
filed a patent-infringement case against Gilead.53 
Although the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal accused the DOJ 
of being a patent troll, there is evidence that the DOJ’s case has merit.54 Mylan, 
which sells a generic version of Truvada in Europe and Australia, challenged 
the CDC’s patents. The European Patent Office rejected Mylan’s claim, and 
Mylan now pays royalties to the United States.55 
Gilead has denied the allegations in the DOJ complaint and sought to open 
a second front by asking the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to reexamine 
the patent issued to the CDC.56 Gilead’s position is that the patent should not 
have been issued since “medical professionals were widely discussing Truvada 
. . . for prevention of [HIV] before the government filed its patent claim in 
2006.”57 
It is true that the CDC’s researchers were not the first to recognize the 
possibility of using antiretroviral drugs to prevent HIV transmission; that idea 
dates back to the 1990s.58 Nor were they the first to think of using tenofovir 
prophylactically. In 1995, Science published a study where researchers at the 
University of Washington demonstrated the potential of tenofovir, referred to 
as PMPA, to protect uninfected monkeys from the Simian Immunodeficiency 
Virus (SIV), a virus similar to HIV that is used in tests performed on 
 
51. US Government Sues Gilead Over Patents for HIV PrEP, Healio News (Nov. 7, 
2019), https://www.healio.com/news/infectious-disease/20191107/us-government-sues-gilead-over-
patent-for-hiv-prep [https://perma.cc/YX7T-XS92]. 
52. Statement, Treatment Action Grp., Advocates Must Press the CDC to Enforce Its 




53. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 19-1212, United States Files Complaint 
against Pharmaceutical Company Gilead for Patent Infringement Related to Truvada® and Descovy® 
For Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis of HIV (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-files-
complaint-against-pharmaceutical-company-gilead-patent-infringement [https://perma.cc/D2AW-
79WW]. The government’s lawsuit against Gilead also applies to a second drug, Descovy, that is also 
used as PrEP.  
54. The Editorial Board, supra note 50. 
55. US: AIDS Activists Skewer CDC for Conflicting Stance on Collecting HIV Drug 
Royalties, EQUAL EYES (Apr. 16, 2019), https://equal-eyes.org/database/2019/4/16/us-aids-activists-
skewer-cdc-for-conflicting-stance-on-collecting-hiv-drug-royalties [https://perma.cc/2VVF-G9TU]. 
56. Gilead Files Challenge to Government Patents for HIV Prevention Pill, AVAC: 
GLOBAL ADVOC. FOR HIV PREVENTION (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.avac.org/news/gilead-files-
challenge-government-patents-hiv-prevention-pill [https://perma.cc/358J-BD62]. 
57. Id. 
58. John Cohen, Untangling the Trump Administration’s Lawsuit over an HIV 
Prevention Drug, SCI. MAG. (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/11/untangling-
trump-administration-s-lawsuit-over-hiv-prevention-drug [https://perma.cc/BY6V-S6C8]. 
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monkeys.59 The 1995 study also noted the possibility that tenofovir “may [] 
have an important role in combination therapies or strategies against HIV.”60 
Obviously, that observation is unspecific. It does not say, for example, 
whether the study’s authors considered pairing FTC with TDF/PMPA. It seems 
unlikely that they did. The FDA only approved FTC as a treatment for HIV in 
humans eight years after the Science study appeared.61 Even if the general idea 
of combining TDF with other drugs was not novel, the more specific idea of 
coupling it with FTC may have been. 
Gilead could have beaten the CDC to the punch by exploring the 
possibility of using FTC and TDF together. It supplied the quantities of both 
drugs that the CDC’s researchers used in their studies.62 But Gilead did not 
pursue this angle. The company even declined to test TDF alone as PrEP. It had 
“no interest in pursuing PrEP because of fears that uninfected people who take 
tenofovir and still become infected might sue the company.”63 Nor did Gilead 
discover FTC. Scientists at Emory University, one of whom was Dr. Raymond 
Schinazi, the head researcher at Pharmasset, did that, and their research was 
funded by the NIH.64 That is why Emory University held a royalty interest in 
the drug—an interest that Gilead paid $525 million to acquire.65 
The DOJ contends that the idea of combining TDF and FTC for use as 
PrEP was novel. It points out that studies conducted through 2006, which 
employed single drugs, including TDF and FTC, were disappointing. “Based 
on these results,” the DOJ asserts, “no one in the field expected a tenofovir 
prodrug in combination with FTC, or any other type of PrEP regimen, to have 
the superior effectiveness that the FTC/tenofovir prodrug regimens are known 
to have today.”66 Nor had the two-drug regimen been studied. “Prior to CDC’s 
 
59. Che-Chung Tsai et al., Prevention of SIV Infection in Macaques by (R)-9-(2-
Phosphonylmethoxypropyl)adenine, 270 SCI. 1197 (1995). 
60. Id. 
61. Dennis C. Liotta & George R. Painter, Discovery and Development of the Anti-
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Drug, Emtricitabine (Emtriva, FTC), 49 ACCT. CHEMICAL RES. 2091 
(2016). 




63. Jon Cohen, Prevention Cocktails: Combining Tools To Stop HIV’s Spread, 309 
SCI. 1002, 1004 (2005).  
64. Christopher J. Morten & Amy Kapczynski, United States v. Gilead: Can a Lawsuit 
Yield Better Access to PrEP?, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Nov. 18, 2019), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20191118.218552/full; see also Rick Mullin, Emory 
Gets $525 Million for AIDS Drug, CHEMICAL ENGINEERING NEWS (July 25, 2005), 
https://cen.acs.org/articles/83/i30/Emory-525-Million-AIDS-Drug.html [https://perma.cc/8GMP-7W37] 
(stating that “[much of the research on emtricitabine was done with NIH funding”); Tsai et al., supra 
note 59, at 1199 n.25 (acknowledging grants received from NIH).  
65. Press Release, Emory Univ., Gilead Sciences and Royalty Pharma Announce $525 
Million Agreement with Emory University to Purchase Royalty Interest for Emtricitabine (July 18, 
2005), http://www.emory.edu/news/Releases/emtri [https://perma.cc/NZH8-JYGU]. 
66. Complaint, supra note 62, ¶ 91.  
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patented work, no preclinical or clinical PrEP studies during the mid-2000s 
were conducted using the combination of FTC and TDF []. Only the CDC 
researchers focused their studies on a two-drug regimen.”67 
To explore the two-drug regimen’s potential for preventing infection, the 
CDC’s researchers created a new protocol for exposing macaques to SIV. 
Instead of giving them “a single high dose” exposure, as had been done in prior 
experiments, “the virus was painstakingly administered into rhesus macaques in 
repeated and precise low doses, by applying it vaginally or rectally, with the 
intent to more accurately model the conditions by which HIV is sexually 
transmitted in humans.”68 That protocol for testing effectiveness in macaques 
seems to have been a noteworthy innovation. Without it, studies of the 
effectiveness of drug combinations as PrEP may have continued to produce 
unimpressive findings.69 
Hoping to give the government the leverage needed to force Gilead to sell 
Truvada more cheaply, advocacy groups have taken pains to show that the 
government’s patents are valid.70 The Global Health Justice Partnership at the 
Yale Law School produced a report authored by Christopher J. Morten, a patent 
attorney, who opined that the CDC’s patents for PrEP “appear to be valid and 
enforceable.”71 Morten and Amy Kapczynski, one of the Partnership’s 
codirectors, also published a Health Affairs Blog column defending the patents 
at length.72 Both the column and the report were part of “a wave of pressure . . . 
from a coalition of activists, HIV care providers, and civil society groups 
organized by the PrEP4All Collaboration [], urging HHS and its constituent 
agency, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), to assert 
government-owned ‘patents for PrEP’ against Gilead.”73 
Eventually, the validity of the CDC’s patents—and claims of Gilead’s 
infringement of them—will be determined authoritatively. Either way, it will 
continue to be true that taxpayers bore a large portion of the cost of 
demonstrating the safety and effectiveness of Truvada as PrEP. Thus, it will 
also be true, as HHS asserts, that “Gilead has profited from research funded by 
hundreds of millions of taxpayer do64llars and reaped billions from PrEP 
 
67. Id. ¶ 92. 
68. Id. ¶¶ 97-98.  
69. The researchers overcame other technical problems too. For example, they 
determined the dosages of FTC that, when given to macaques, would mimic the effectiveness of FTC in 
humans. Id. ¶¶ 100-104. 
70. Morten & Kapczynski, supra note 64. Although a judgment in a patent-
infringement action could only require Gilead to pay damages, a settlement with the government could 
contain a price cap. See Donald G. McNeil & Apoorva Mandavilli, Who Owns H.I.V.-Prevention 
Drugs? The Taxpayers, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/08/health/hiv-prevention-truvada-patents.html 
[https://perma.cc/2WUF-N9PJ]. 
71. Yale Global Health Justice Partnership, Summary of Statement on CDC’s Patents 
for PrEP, YALE L. SCH., https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/ghjp/documents/ghjp2-
pagestatement.pdf [https://perma.cc/YF9K-2KLM] (summarizing the findings of Morten’s report).  
72. Morten & Kapczynski, supra note 64. 
73. Id. 
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through the sale of Truvada[].”74 The creation of an effective prophylactic 
against HIV “was a public health triumph that was spurred by years of 
government-funded research.”75 
It seems clear that the returns Gilead has earned on sales of Truvada as 
PrEP bear no relation to the costs and risks it bore in bringing the drug to 
market for that purpose. Although Gilead reportedly “spent $1.1 billion to 
develop the drug, which was first approved in 2004 for treatment of patients 
who already have the HIV virus,” the returns on that investment are generated 
by Truvada sales for its prior purpose: curing HIV.76 The costs and risks at 
issue in the litigation are those borne by Gilead in connection with Truvada’s 
use as PrEP, which appear to be quite small. CDC researchers tested Truvada 
on both humans and macaques to establish the efficacy of Truvada for HIV 
prevention.77 
So what was Gilead’s role in the development of PrEP? According to 
testimony from Robert M. Grant, the lead author on the study in question, 
“‘Gilead’s role was limited to donating study medicine and placebos,’” and 
Gilead was “‘a reluctant partner’ in the research, until demand for the 
prevention use increased in 2013.”78 At a hearing before the House Committee 
on Oversight and Reform, Daniel O’Day, Gilead’s CEO, countered Grant’s 
assertion by stating that “two Gilead researchers were co-authors on the 2010 
prevention trial.”79 Regardless, it seems clear that the returns on sales of 
Truvada as PrEP are massively disproportionate to the costs and risks borne by 
Gilead. 
We noted above that the federal government rarely sues drug companies 
for infringing CDC-held patents; its lawsuit against Gilead is an exception 
attributable to pressure exerted by advocacy groups. In view of the 
government’s customary reluctance to challenge infringements, one may 
wonder why the CDC bothers to acquire patents in the first place. 
The history of government-owned patents is short. Professor Kapczynski 
reports that laboratories participating in a multinational network studying 
influenza initially operated without patenting discoveries.80 The CDC became 
 
74. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., United States Files Patent 
Infringement Lawsuit Against Gilead Related to Truvada® and Descovy® For Pre-Exposure 
Prophylaxis of HIV (2019), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2019/11/06/us-files-patent-infringement-
lawsuit-against-gilead-pre-exposure-prophylaxis-hiv.html [https://perma.cc/MV9G-ZS4R]. 
75. Robert Langreth & Kristin V. Brown, Gilead’s $21,000 Drug Is Being Blamed for 





78. Id.  
79. Id. 
80. Amy Kapczynski, Order Without Intellectual Property Law: Open Science in 
Influenza, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1539 (2017). 
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“one of the few labs to hold such patents.”81 Its decision was “defensive,” 
seeking “to prevent private firms from taking unfair advantage of” publicly 
supported research.82 
But it seems unlikely that the motives underlying government-owned 
patents are wholly defensive. For one thing, under existing law, a private entity 
cannot obtain a patent on a discovery made at the CDC or at any other 
laboratory in the network. To obtain a patent, a private entity that took 
advantage of publicly available research findings would have to innovate, and 
any patent it secured would be limited to the innovation. For another, before 
Bayh-Dole, the government controlled patents on inventions that were created 
with public funds. As noted in Part I, Senators Bayh and Dole believed that this 
arrangement discouraged private companies from using publicly supported 
inventions to create commercially viable products. They proposed the Act “to 
promote collaboration between commercial and non-profit concerns; and to 
enhance the commercialization and public availability of the inventions.”83 
Congress later reinforced this object by passing the Federal Technology 
Transfer Act of 1986,84 which gave federal laboratories a “mandate to ensure 
that new technologies . . . are transferred to the private sector and 
commercialized in an expeditious and efficient manner.”85 In keeping with this 
mandate, the official policy of the U.S. Public Health Service is: 
[to] seek patent protection on biomedical technologies only when a patent 
facilitates availability of the technology to the public for preventive, diagnostic, 
therapeutic, or research use, or other commercial use. Generally a patent is 
necessary to facilitate and attract investment by commercial partners for further 
research and commercial development of the technology, such as where the 
utility of the patentable subject matter is as a potential preventive, diagnostic, or 
therapeutic product. However, a patent might also be necessary to encourage a 
commercial partner to make available for research use important materials or 
products.86 
In short, giving the NIH and other government agencies the power to hold 
patents serves to encourage private companies to use publicly sponsored 
research to develop and commercialize useful products and services. There is 
no hint in any of these materials that doing so takes “unfair advantage” of the 
publicly sponsored research. 
 
81. Id. at 1623. 
82. Id. 
83. The Bayh-Dole Act at 25, BAYHDOLE25, INC. 19 (Apr. 17, 2006), 
https://ipmall.law.unh.edu/sites/default/files/BAYHDOLE/BayhDole25_WhitePaper.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B9A9-RZPR]. 
84. Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785, 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3701 (2018)). 
85. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH 
(NIH) WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH TOOLS (1998), 
https://www.mmrrc.org/about/NIH_research_tools_policy [https://perma.cc/BS6B-XV5Y]. 
86. Id. at app. D.1 
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Indeed, if empowering the NIH to hold patents facilitates the use of 
publicly supported inventions by private entities, the DOJ’s lawsuit against 
Gilead is hard to explain. After scientists at the NIH discovered that TDF and 
FTC effectively prevent people from contracting HIV when used in 
combination, Gilead gained FDA approval for the treatment and started selling 
Truvada. Gilead thus did what the sponsors of the Bayh-Dole Act wanted: it 
quickly turned a technology created with public support into a commercial 
product. 
The DOJ’s lawsuit stands the Bayh-Dole Act on its head. Instead of 
celebrating the rapid commercialization of the idea behind PrEP, the lawsuit 
seeks to punish Gilead for violating the government’s patents. That reversal is 
politically motivated. Truvada is too expensive for millions of Americans to 
afford, and advocacy groups want the government to force Gilead to sell it 
more cheaply by threatening to demand billions of dollars in royalties unless 
the company complies. Meanwhile, the Trump administration has prioritized 
reducing drug prices and likely would celebrate a decision to cut Truvada’s 
price. The lawsuit represents an instance of agreement between groups on 
opposite sides of the partisan divide. 
Lawsuits are a clumsy way to address the paying-twice critique. Filings 
are rare and politically motivated. Their outcomes are hard to predict. Even if 
the government obtains a judgment against Gilead or settles, the likelihood is 
low that the amount transferred will bear any relation to the number of dollars 
that taxpayers provided or to the risks borne by Gilead in bringing the product 
to market. Damages for patent infringement are typically based on either a 
reasonable royalty or on lost profits—not on the patent holders’ development 
costs.87 
Replacing patents with prizes would better address the paying-twice 
critique, as we discuss in Section III.C. The paying-twice critique has some 
surface plausibility only because patents enable inventors to gouge the public 
by giving them time-limited monopolies on sales.88 Because a prize system 
would reward inventors without conferring monopolies, drugs would be priced 
at market rates, and the critique would lose its force. The need for lawsuits like 
the one the DOJ filed against Gilead would also disappear. 
*   *   * 
As these two case studies indicate, the government can contribute in a 
variety of ways to drug research and development. It can conduct the research 
itself, and it can (but need not) patent the resulting inventions. It can help fund 
 
87. See Rebecca Wolitz, Recent Litigation Developments Regarding Drug Pricing and 
Access, STAN. L. SCH.: SLS L. & BIOSCIENCES BLOG (Jan. 3, 2020), 
https://law.stanford.edu/2020/01/03/recent-litigation-developments-regarding-drug-pricing-and-access 
[https://perma.cc/4SFC-BUPR] (noting the complexities of valuing early stage contributions in a patent 
infringement case).  
88. In theory, the government-conferred patent-based monopoly may not actually 
result in pricing power if there are adequate substitutes, switching costs are low, and market entry is 
easy. In practice, these preconditions are often not met. SILVER & HYMAN, supra note 24, at 30-39. 
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basic or applied research in an area, and any resulting invention might be 
patented by a private entity. It can invest a little or a lot in any given disease, 
molecule, or drug regimen. And the government’s investments can be tightly 
linked to a given treatment, or quite remote. We now turn to the extent to which 
our two case studies are representative of the broader universe of approved 
drugs and medical devices. 
B. The View from 10,000 Feet 
The conventional wisdom is that “the upstream, pre-competitive, basic 
science research that so many new drugs depend on is . . . predominantly 
funded by public support, while clinical trials are . . . predominantly funded by 
the pharmaceutical industry.”89 This belief supports the policy of allowing 
pharmaceutical companies to secure the exclusive right to sell new medicines 
because it implies that private companies shoulder the substantial cost of 
“translational research”: “the ‘bench-to-bedside’ enterprise of harnessing 
knowledge from basic sciences to produce new drugs, devices, and treatment 
options for patients.”90 
In reality, financial responsibility for basic research and translational 
research is divided less neatly than the conventional wisdom posits. Businesses 
have long sponsored a good deal of basic research, and in recent decades their 
share of the burden has increased: 
Data from ongoing surveys by the National Science Foundation (NSF) show that 
federal agencies provided only 44% of the $86 billion spent on basic research in 
2015. The federal share, which topped 70% throughout the 1960s and ‘70s, 
stood at 61% as recently as 2004 before falling below 50% in 2013.91 
Pharmaceutical companies have stepped up their investment in basic 
research: Drug-company investment in basic research soared from $3 billion in 
2008 to $8.1 billion in 2014, according to the most recent NSF data by business 
sector. Spending on basic research by all U.S. businesses nearly doubled over 
that same period, from $13.9 billion to $24.5 billion.92 Funding by universities 
and private foundations has also increased.93 
The second component of the conventional wisdom—that the private 
sector bears the cost of translational research—appears to be sounder. In 2015, 
$316 billion was spent on development, “[a]lmost all” of which was 
 
89. Rahul K. Nayak, Jerry Avorn & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Public Sector Financial 
Support for Late Stage Discovery of New Drugs in the United States: Cohort Study, BRIT. MED. J. 367, 
367 (2019). 
90. Steven H. Woolf, The Meaning of Translational Research and Why It Matters, 299 
JAMA 211 (2008).  
91. Jeffrey Mervis, Data Check: U.S. Government Share of Basic Research Funding 
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funded by industry and done in house, as companies try to convert basic research 
into new drugs, products, and technologies that they hope will generate profits. 
(The pharmaceutical and biotech industry, for example, spent a total of $102 
billion on research and development in 2015, according to Research!America, an 
Arlington, Virginia–based advocacy group.)94 
The public sector’s contribution to translational research on drugs may be 
more important than these figures indicate, however. Public funding tends to be 
supplied at key moments in the development process, to support essential 
academic research on specific drugs, and is associated with drugs of special 
therapeutic value. 
Researchers have used patents to study the contributions made by public 
funding to the creation of new drugs, and found a trend toward increasing 
public-sector involvement95—consistent with “large manufacturers investing 
proportionally less in internal basic and translational research” as their business 
models shifted toward “purchasing drugs developed in start-up companies, 
many spun out of public sector research institutions.”96 
A recent study focused on 248 novel drugs that received FDA approval 
from 2008 to 2017. In addition to scouring patents for signs that public-sector 
institutions were involved in late-stage research, they compiled their own drug-
discovery histories and identified spin-off companies whose origins included 
publicly supported research. Their efforts revealed that 62 (25%) of the novel 
drugs 
had documented late stage research contributions from a publicly supported 
research institution or spin-off company. Forty eight products (19% of all new 
drug approvals) had evidence of direct publicly supported research (table 1 and 
table 2). For all but one, the contributions were related to the drug’s initial 
discovery, synthesis, or other key intellectual property leading to a patentable 
invention. For 30 of these drugs, publicly supported research institutions directly 
held one or more of the key patents. Another seven drugs had direct publicly 
supported research origins, although the patents [] were held by a spin-off 
company.97 
The drugs with late-stage public involvement included “the hepatitis C 
treatment sofosbuvir (Sovaldi) and other sofosbuvir-containing combination 
drugs [that] originated at Pharmasset, a spin-off company based on federally 
funded research performed at Emory University.”98 
The same study found that public support was concentrated on drugs with 
special therapeutic importance. Drugs created with help from publicly 
supported research “were substantially more likely to receive FDA approval 
 
94. Id. 
95. Nayak et al., supra note 89, at 368 (noting that “earlier analyses found public 
sector research institutions to be associated with the patents covering 4.6% of new molecular entities 
approved in 1981-90, 6.7% of new drugs approved in 1990-99, 9.0% of new molecular entities approved 
in 1988-2005, and . . . 13.6% of new molecular entities approved between 1990-2007”). 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 371.  
98. Id. at 372. 
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through one or more expedited development or review pathways . . . and to be 
first in class.”99 They attributed the “flow of publicly funded research 
knowledge into the private sector for commercialization” to an increase in 
public funding for biomedical research and to Bayh-Dole.100 
A different group of researchers assessed the importance of public support 
by studying the contribution NIH funding made to published research 
associated with 210 new molecular entities that received FDA approval from 
2010 to 2016.101 They located more than 2 million publications relating to these 
drugs, found that 600,000 “were associated with NIH-funded projects,” and 
further determined that the relevant projects received more than $100 billion in 
funding. Their efforts showed that NIH funding contributed to the discovery of 
every new molecular entity, including the 84 that were first-in-class treatments. 
Another study focused on the various models of public-private 
collaboration for 113 molecular and biologic drugs approved by the FDA 
between 2006 and 2016.102 They also examined the same information for 39 
failed drugs that the same companies pursued during the same time period. 
Approved drugs had an average of 60 original research papers. Failed drugs 
averaged only 13. The authors inferred that “approved drugs are often 
associated with a more robust data set provided by a large number of 
institutions.”103 When they examined the affiliations of the researchers who 
produced the publications, they found that academics contributed significantly 
to 79% of the publications associated with newly launched biologics and to 
76% of those associated with new molecular entities.104 
This major contribution by “academics” held true for all companies and 
across all therapeutic areas. Conversely, top pharmaceutical companies 
published only 10% of the papers for biologic approvals and 13% for NME 
approvals, while all other institute types contributed 5% or less of the 
publications for biologics and NMEs. For failed drugs, academics contributed 
72% of the pre-termination publications on biologic drugs and 60% on NMEs. 
The lower percent as compared to approved NMEs was largely made up by top 
pharmaceutical- and other pharmaceutical/biotech-company contributions with 
19% and 16% for NMEs, respectively.105 
By focusing on drugs rather than drug targets, the authors showed that 
academic researchers contribute significantly to translational research and are 
especially likely to focus on new drugs that are eventually approved. 
 
99. Id. at 373.  
100. Id. at 374. 
101. Ekaterina G. Cleary et al., Contribution of NIH Funding to New Drug Approvals 
2010–2016, PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 1 (2018). 
102. Xiong Liu, Craig E. Thomas & Christian C. Felder, The Impact of External 
Innovation on New Drug Approvals: A Retrospective Analysis, 563 INT’L J. PHARMACEUTICS 273 
(2019).  
103. Id. at 274. 
104. Id. at 276. 
105. Id. at 280. 
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The studies summarized in this section describe a complicated state of 
affairs in which both public and private organizations make important 
contributions to the discovery of new medications. Although businesses appear 
to spend more dollars on research overall, the public’s contribution is sizeable, 
and the research it supports is disproportionately important. 
Given this factual background, how should we think about the merits of 
the paying-twice critique? What, if anything, needs to be done about this 
situation? Part III turns to that issue. 
III. A Framework for Thinking About the Paying-Twice Critique 
The paying-twice critique has considerable intuitive appeal, which helps 
explain why it has been a policy perennial. Yet that intuitive appeal does not 
necessarily translate into well-founded policy because there are additional 
considerations that the paying-twice critique obscures or ignores.106 To clarify 
those issues, we begin with a short parable. We then discuss the inherent 
difficulty of quantifying the importance of contributions from multiple sources 
in the absence of a market where ex ante bargaining can occur. Finally, we 
offer a prize system as a possible solution to the problem of high drug prices—
a solution that would incentivize drug development, address the paying-twice 
critique, and avoid the deadweight losses that monopolies create. 
A. Parable of the Austin Convention Center 
While working on this Article, one of us happened to walk past the Austin 
Convention Center—a handsome building that was built from 1990 through 
1992 and subsequently renovated from 1999 through 2002 using only public 
funds. In May 2019, the Austin City Council unanimously approved spending 
$1.2 billion more to expand the Convention Center yet again. 
Like all convention centers, the Austin facility is surrounded by hotels and 
restaurants, including some very expensive offerings. The presence of the 
Convention Center obviously increases the demand for these hotels and 
restaurants. A large number of people will converge on Austin to attend events 
held at the Convention Center, each looking for places to stay and to eat. In 
economic terms, the city of Austin created a positive externality by building the 
Convention Center, as well as some negative externalities due to traffic and 
congestion. Alternatively, to the extent the Convention Center is nonrival and 
nonexcludable, the city of Austin was simply investing in a public good.107 
 
106. See Wolitz, supra note 5, at 185-89 (noting the complexities of the paying-twice 
critique, and offering three distinct lenses for thinking about the issue).  
107. To the extent the city of Austin is able to exclude, the Convention Center is more 
properly viewed as a club good, rather than a public good. On the difference between public goods and 
club goods, see Patrick McNutt, Public Goods and Club Goods, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS § 0750, at 927 (Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest eds., 1999),. 
https://reference.findlaw.com/lawandeconomics/literature-reviews/0750-public-goods-andamp-club-
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What should we make of the fact that Austin taxpayers paid for the 
Convention Center? More specifically, do these circumstances provide a valid 
basis for capping the amounts that hotels and restaurants near the Convention 
Center can charge for their wares? For requiring those hotels and restaurants to 
offer a lower price to residents of Austin? For taxing people who stay in hotels 
and eat at restaurants near the convention center? For taxing people who stay in 
hotels and eat in restaurants in Austin more generally—or in Travis County, 
where Austin is located? Or should the city of Austin view a convention center 
as an infrastructure investment to be funded solely by the taxpayers? 
As it happens, Austin partially funds the Convention Center by imposing a 
dedicated tax on all hotel stays, whether near the Convention Center or not.108 
By contrast, Austin does not impose a dedicated tax on restaurants to fund the 
Convention Center. More importantly, Austin does not impose a price cap on 
the amounts that hotels and restaurants can charge or attempt to ensure that 
they are charging only reasonable amounts, even when the customers are only 
in town because of an event being held at the Convention Center. 
Why do we open this Section with a case study of the Austin Convention 
Center? Our parable makes several important points: 
(1) For pure public goods, which are nonrival and nonexcludable, the 
public should not expect users to materially contribute to funding.109 Stated 
differently, for such goods, there is likely to be one principal payer—i.e., the 
taxpayers. 
(2) For products and services that have elements of a public good but are 
to varying degrees rivalrous and excludable (like the Austin Convention 
Center), there are likely to be multiple payers, with the precise details of their 
contributions varying depending on institutional dynamics and politics. 
(3) If we want to ensure that the public receives a fair return on whatever 
funds it has invested in nonpublic goods (and we should), it is unlikely that the 
optimal strategy for doing so is to require reasonable pricing of the products 
and services that benefit directly or indirectly from those investments. 
Imposing and enforcing a reasonable-pricing constraint requires taxpayers to 
fund a complex administrative system to monitor and adjust prices. The history 
 
goods.html [https://perma.cc/NNH6-JUKV]. However, in our experience, convention centers and sports 
stadiums are largely or entirely publicly funded. This suggests that ordinary citizens and sports fans (but 
not economists) think of these facilities as public goods, which are appropriately funded entirely with 
public funds. 
108. A fight is currently brewing over whether Austin has gobbled up more than its 
share of hotel-stay taxes, at the expense of Travis County, which wants to expand its own exposition 
center. Cindy Widner, City Tackles Convention Center Expansion with Hotel Tax Rate Hike, CURBED 
AUSTIN (Aug. 12, 2019), https://austin.curbed.com/2019/8/12/20802030/austin-hotel-tax-rate-increase 
[https://perma.cc/Z7DC-PSC2].  
109. Although the Austin Convention Center is a club good, most people seem to 
believe such facilities are public goods. See supra note 107.  
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of price-setting is not one that inspires confidence, even if one does not factor 
technological change and the public-choice dynamics into the equation.110 
It is not an accident that we do not observe government-imposed price 
constraints on either hotels or restaurants, even in the area immediately 
surrounding the Austin Convention Center. 
Our parable also points to a plausible set of regulatory responses to the 
circumstances we confront when the government contributes to the 
development of a valuable product or service. One approach (exemplified by 
Austin’s tax on hotels) is to allow the market to set prices for the desired goods 
and services and then tax the producers to secure a reasonable return on the 
government’s investment.111 An alternative approach (exemplified by Austin’s 
nontaxation of restaurants) is to treat the Convention Center as a public good 
that must be funded by the government if it is to exist at all, and the benefits to 
the restaurants as a positive externality that need not be recouped. 
Of course, we should not be naïve about the larger context in which these 
cost-allocation decisions are being made. Austin opts for one approach (taxing 
hotel stays) when dealing with people who are from out-of-town and another 
(not taxing meals bought at restaurants) when people are more likely to be 
residents who vote in local elections.112 Regardless, both of these approaches 
 
110.  ROBERT L. SCHUETTINGER & EAMONN F. BUTLER, FORTY CENTURIES OF WAGE 
AND PRICE CONTROLS: HOW NOT TO FIGHT INFLATION (2014).  
111. Cf. Wolitz, supra note 5, at 185 (noting that from a transactional perspective, the 
paying twice critique could be addressed by imposing “additional fees, royalties, or the repayment of the 
government’s initial investment,” rather than through pricing control). 
112. Of course, these patterns are not unique to Austin, nor to the funding of 
convention centers. In California, pursuant to Proposition 13, residential property tax valuation for 
newcomers is based on the market price of the property. For incumbents, valuation may not increase 
more than a specified amount per year, regardless of actual market prices. In practice, this approach 
dramatically increases the property tax burden on newcomers—which is why it is called the “welcome 
stranger” approach. Gale A. Norton, The ‘Welcome Stranger’ Provision of Prop. 13 Clearly Is 
Unwelcome, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 9, 1989), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1989-02-09-me-
2894-story.html [https://perma.cc/KR2R-TSUT] (“[C]onsider two homes that were each worth $100,000 
in 1975. One home has frequent turnovers while the other remains in the same ownership. Assuming 
that home prices increase 7% per year, the transferred house would have a taxable value of more than 
$750,000 in the year 2005. The assessed value of the other house, increasing at only 2% a year, would 
be listed on the assessment rolls at about $180,000.”). The Supreme Court upheld California’s “welcome 
stranger” approach in Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992).  
There are similar disparities with the price of car rentals at airports versus in-town:  
I’ve covered the travel industry for quite a few years, and am well aware that airport rental car 
counters gouge customers with high rates and even higher taxes and mandatory fees. The 
blame for this doesn’t necessarily fall on greedy rental car companies. Instead, a big part of the 
explanation for this situation is that the most (only?) popular tax is one that’s not paid by the 
people approving of it. Politicians and voters around the country routinely approve new or 
higher taxes and fees on airport rental cars and hotel rooms—which, by and large, hit visiting 
travelers rather than locals in the pocketbook. 
 
It’s a different story at neighborhood rental car locations, however. In these spots, the typical 
customer is someone who lives in the area—and who would be outraged and have an earful to 
give to the local lawmakers if the taxes and fees were insane. 
Brad Tuttle, The Surprising Way I’m Saving $1,800 on My Rental Car This Summer, MONEY (June 23, 
2016), https://money.com/save-money-rental-car-airport [https://perma.cc/F88Y-8Y79]. 
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are far easier to administer and to adjust to changing circumstances than the 
reasonable-pricing model envisioned by proponents of the paying-twice 
critique. 
Of course, the Austin Convention Center is not a drug, let alone a 
lifesaving one. But even for goods and services that are necessities of life, the 
same basic analysis should apply. Believing otherwise will not work out well 
for anyone involved—least of all those who want to obtain the next generation 
of lifesaving drugs. Section III.B situates this problem in a broader theoretical 
framework. 
B. Theoretical Framework 
Stepping back from the details of our case study of the Austin Convention 
Center, there are endless examples of multiple parties contributing to the 
creation of a valuable asset. Some of these assets are trivial while others are 
vital contributors to human health and wealth. 
How should the law go about sorting out the relative contributions of each 
of these parties, thereby ensuring that they receive what they are due? Contracts 
provide the most obvious solution, at least when the parties are able to 
negotiate ex ante. Individuals that are starting a business together can choose 
their corporate form (e.g., corporation, partnership or LLC, for-profit or 
nonprofit) and allocate ownership interest based on their ex ante agreement of 
the relative value of the assets contributed by each party. For some transactions 
and circumstances, sweat equity or political connections will be highly valued, 
while for others, it is cash or hard assets that are more important to the success 
of the enterprise. Some individuals will want equity, while others will prefer 
debt. Some employees will want stock options, while others will prefer salary. 
Salary may be tied to success, to hours worked, or to both. And so on. 
If the parties have not negotiated a binding agreement, or if the agreement 
they negotiated is silent on the issue in question, the law has developed various 
default rules for sorting out such matters. For example, the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC) provides gap-fillers in the event the parties did not 
explicitly contract as to any element other than quantity.113 More broadly, the 
law of restitution is designed to prevent unjust enrichment of one party at the 
expense of the other.114 
 
113. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 95-96 (1989) (“Although price and quantity are probably the 
two most essential issues on which to reach agreement, the U.C.C. establishes radically different 
defaults. If the parties leave out the price, the U.C.C. fills the gap with ‘a reasonable price.’ If the parties 
leave out the quantity, the U.C.C. refuses to enforce the contract.”); Omri Ben-Shahar, ‘Agreeing to 
Disagree’: Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 389, 389 (observing 
that the UCC “aggressively supplements the parties’ agreement with reasonable or average terms, 
including price terms”).  
114. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (AM. L. 
INST. 2011) (“A person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is subject to liability in 
restitution.”). 
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Once again, as with our parable of the Austin Convention Center, the 
takeaway is simple. When parties are able to negotiate with one another in 
advance, they reach terms that reflect the relative value of their anticipated 
contributions to the joint enterprise. In the absence of an ex ante contract that 
speaks to the issue, the legal system has developed various default rules—again 
seeking to capture the terms the parties would have negotiated if transaction 
costs were low and they had thought about the issue. In the context of the drug-
pricing issue, it is simply implausible that the government could insist on 
reasonable pricing for all drugs where the government had any involvement 
whatsoever in the underlying R&D process. 
Worse still, history shows conclusively that price controls create shortages 
which governments then try to fix by ad hoc means, such as subsidizing 
the discouraged activity. In the case of the pharmaceutical industry, these 
subsidies go to research and development. . . . Again, however, the difficulty 
arises in choosing the level of the subsidy, deciding whether and how to award it 
to for‐profit corporations, and avoiding inefficient lobbying and corruption. In 
practice, these are very difficult issues to manage in a way that benefits 
consumers.115 
It is not an accident that the NIH’s attempts to insist on a reasonable-
pricing term from 1989 to 1995 prompted many pharmaceutical companies to 
walk.116 Their departures led the NIH to drop this term from its contracts, 
observing that its inclusion was detracting from the goals set by Bayh-Dole.117 
If the government wants a better deal than the one struck by Bayh-Dole, 
the obvious solution (as long as we are maintaining the current patent-based 
system) is to demand a royalty reflecting the risk-adjusted value of the licensed 
technology. Those funds can be used to defray the cost of future publicly 
funded research (reducing the paying-twice problem going forward) or to 
subsidize the treatment costs of everyone who needs the drug in question. 
Alternatively, the government can take the royalty in the form of a price 
reduction for beneficiaries of government-funded programs. Finally, the money 
could be deposited into the general fund and be used for whatever purpose 
Congress desires. Any of these royalty-based strategies are far more achievable 
and administrable than the reasonable pricing model proposed by the paying-
twice crowd. 
 
115. Fiona M. Scott Morton, The Problems of Price Controls, CATO INST. (June 20, 
2001), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/problems-price-controls [https://perma.cc/PDS8-
CEDU]. 
116. See NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, supra note 14 (“Many companies withdrew from 
any further interaction with NIH because of this stipulation.”). 
117. Id. (“Both NIH and its industry counterparts came to the realization that this 
policy had the effect of posing a barrier to expanded research relationships and, therefore, was contrary 
to the Bayh-Dole Act.”).  
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C. A Better Alternative: Prize-Based Reform 
As we explain in more detail in Overcharged, the existing patent-based 
system has both strengths and weaknesses.118 Its main strength is that patents 
encourage inventors to bear the costs and risks associated with discovering new 
drugs. Its main weaknesses are two. First, because the strength of the incentive 
to innovate depends on the volume of sales, patents fail to incentivize 
drugmakers to create therapies for illnesses suffered by small populations. 
Second, the patent-created sales monopolies often enable inventors to charge 
supra-competitive prices and impose substantial deadweight losses, as many 
consumers who value drugs above the marginal cost of production are excluded 
from the market. 
Existing arrangements for paying for prescription drugs create additional 
problems. Because Medicare, Medicaid, and private insurers have difficulty 
refusing to pay for therapies approved by the FDA, drugmakers can set prices 
above the monopoly level that would prevail if consumers purchased drugs 
directly. The absence of a ceiling on prices encourages drugmakers to create 
new medicines that are only marginally better than existing treatments yet 
extremely expensive. 
Like other authors, we believe that prizes can ameliorate these problems 
and the option of replacing the patent-based system, including the Bayh-Dole 
Act, the Orphan Drug Act, and the Unapproved Drugs Initiative, with a system 
based on prizes should be seriously considered.119 Prizes would “separate the 
market for products from the market for innovations by removing the link 
between R&D incentives and product prices.”120 In the latter market, all 
companies would be free to manufacture and sell newly discovered drugs, just 
as they are able to produce generic medicines today. Competition would reduce 
drug prices to their lowest sustainable levels, eliminating the deadweight losses 
associated with patents. 
The competition spurred by a prize regime would also make it much 
harder for drug companies to set inflated prices. When Gilead introduced 
Sovaldi, it could charge $84,000 for a course of treatment because it had a 
guaranteed market.121 Medicare had to buy Sovaldi for seniors with hepatitis C 
and could not bargain over the price.122 Private insurers and Medicaid had 
somewhat greater leverage, especially when alternatives like the Viekira Pak 
became available, but they too paid through the nose.123 Under a prize regime, 
Gilead wouldn’t have been able to charge more than the marginal cost of 
 
118. SILVER & HYMAN, supra note 24, at 27-30, 35, 40. 
119. For sources, see James Love & Tim Hubbard, Prizes for Innovation of New 
Medicines and Vaccines, 18 ANN. HEALTH L. 155, 156 n.3 (2009). 
120. Id. at 159. 
121. See SILVER & HYMAN, supra note 24, at ch. 2. 
122. Id. at 55. 
123. Id. at 56. 
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production since any other company could supply the drug. Payors could even 
run an auction to determine which manufacturer would have the right to supply 
Sovaldi to their beneficiaries. 
Substituting prizes for patents would also make it possible to rationalize 
the financial incentives for developing new drugs. Currently, expected prices 
and sales volumes determine the strength of these incentives. This arrangement 
encourages pharmaceutical companies to create new cancer treatments that 
retail for hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars despite extending 
patients’ lives only briefly.124 By contrast, it gives them little reason to develop 
new antibiotics with the potential to save lives because doctors will use these 
new drugs only when all existing antibiotics fail.125 By linking rewards to “the 
impact of innovations on health care outcomes,” prizes could focus researchers’ 
energies on drugs that are needed.126 
A prize system also would eliminate the need for programs which use the 
prospect of earning monopoly rents, tax breaks, and other emoluments to 
encourage researchers to develop treatments for uncommon diseases (i.e., the 
Orphan Drug Act (ODA)) and establish the efficacy and safety of drugs that 
were on the market before testing requirements were imposed (i.e., the FDA’s 
unapproved drugs initiative (UDI)). The ODA entitles manufacturers to seven 
years of marketing exclusivity on drugs prescribed for the orphan indication; 
the UDI gives them three for all prescriptions. 
Pharmaceutical companies have gamed both programs. In the case of 
colchicine, an ancient treatment for gout (a common illness) that also helps 
patients with familial Mediterranean fever (a rare one), a drugmaker secured 3 
years of marketing exclusivity under the UDI and 7 years under the ODA after 
conducting a small controlled trial on gout sufferers. After the FDA ordered all 
other manufacturers to stop producing colchicine, the monopoly-holder raised 
the price from $0.09 per tablet to $5—illustrating the adverse (but almost 
entirely off-budget) consequences of casually handing out market exclusivity. 
The government could have completely avoided these consequences by 
offering a small prize for running tests on colchicine.127 
Drug companies routinely game the ODA by using it to obtain 
monopolies on drugs that are eventually sold to large populations. For example, 
Reckitt Benckiser is said to have used the ODA in an “alarming” manner by 
 
124. Alice Chen & Dana Goldman, Opinion, Accounting for Hope: Using ‘Mean 
Survival Gain’ to Price New Cancer Drugs, STAT NEWS (Oct. 14, 2019), 
https://www.statnews.com/2019/10/14/mean-survival-gain-pricing-cancer-drugs 
[https://perma.cc/P8WL-FNJF]; Meghana Keshavan, Fixing a ‘Market Failure’: To Develop New 
Antibiotics, Upend the Incentive Structure, Experts Urge, STAT NEWS (May 2, 2019), 
https://www.statnews.com/2019/05/02/fixing-a-market-failure-to-develop-new-antibiotics-upend-the-
incentive-structure-experts-urge [https://perma.cc/A3TP-AGL3].  
125. Id. 
126. Love & Hubbard, supra note 119, at 159.  
127. Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Reductions in Use of Colchicine After FDA 
Enforcement of Market Exclusivity in a Commercially Insured Population, 30 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 
1633 (2015).  
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misleading the FDA about the potential profitability of a treatment for Opioid 
Use Disorder.128 It reportedly obtained seven years of marketing exclusivity by 
telling the FDA that “its Subutex (buprenorphine) and Suboxone 
(buprenorphine-naloxone) tablets wouldn’t recoup their costs of 
development.”129 In fact, both drugs were so profitable that, in response to 
complaints from generic pharmaceutical companies, the FDA revoked their 
orphan status.130 
More recently and appallingly, Gilead gamed the ODA by obtaining 
orphan status for remdesivir, a drug being studied as a treatment for COVID-
19. “Orphan status is generally reserved for companies that may not recoup 
their research costs and for drugs which treat conditions affecting fewer than 
200,000 people.”131 The number of Americans alone who might eventually 
contract COVID-19 could easily run into the millions, the worldwide market 
for remdesivir could be far larger, and analysts at Bank of America predicted 
that remdesivir would generate $2.5 billion in revenue.132 But at the time 
Gilead applied, fewer than 200,000 Americans had been diagnosed with the 
disease, so remdesivir satisfied the technical regulatory requirement.133 Even 
so, and not at all surprisingly, the FDA’s approval of Gilead’s application 
sparked widespread outrage. Some critics lodged the paying-twice complaint, 
pointing out that “Gilead developed remdesivir with at least $79 million in 
government funds.”134 The firestorm of criticism was so intense that Gilead 
quickly capitulated and withdrew is application. In its public statement, the 
company claimed to have sought orphan status for remdesivir so that it would 
not have to conduct “a pediatric study plan prior to the submission of a New 
Drug Application—a process that can take up to 210 days to review.”135 
 
128.  Rebecca L. Haffajee & Richard G. Frank, Abuses of FDA, Regulatory 
Procedures — The Case of Suboxone, 382 NEW ENG. J. MED. 496 (2020). 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Julia Conley, ‘Big Win’: Caving to Pressure Campaign, Gilead Sciences 
Relinquishes Monopoly Claim for Promising Coronavirus Treatment, COMMON DREAMS (Mar. 26, 
2020), https://www.commondreams.org/news/2020/03/26/big-win-caving-pressure-campaign-gilead-
sciences-relinquishes-monopoly-claim [https://perma.cc/3LFU-2UU7]. For background on the ODA, see 
Developing Products for Rare Diseases and Conditions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION (Dec. 20, 
2018), https://www.fda.gov/industry/developing-products-rare-diseases-
conditions[https://perma.cc/D9B2-V7QT]. 
132. Drew Armstrong & Bailey Lipschultz, Gilead Stock Surges After WHO 
Comments on Its Coronavirus Drug, ALJAZEERA IMPACT (Feb. 24, 2020), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/gilead-stock-surges-comments-coronavirus-drug-
200224194452522.html [https://perma.cc/V8KW-322H]. 
133. Matthew Brown, Fact Check: Drugmaker Gilead Sciences Claimed Right to a 
Possible COVID-19 Treatment, USA TODAY (Mar. 27, 2020), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/factcheck/2020/03/27/fact-check-coronavirus-gilead-sciences-
received-withdrew-fda-orphan-status-remdesivir/2922115001 [https://perma.cc/WM92-25M5]. 
134. Conley, supra note 131. 
135. Company Statement, Gilead Scis., Gilead Sciences Statement on Request to 
Rescind Remdesivir Orphan Drug Designation, https://www.gilead.com/news-and-press/company-
statements/gilead-sciences-statement-on-request-to-rescind-remdesivir-orphan-drug-designation 
[https://perma.cc/2P3Y-H3GZ]. 
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Manufacturers also game the ODA by obtaining “multiple orphan drug 
designations for the same drug in different diseases.”136 They then stack their 
“seven-year monopolies on top of each other and protect their exclusivity in the 
initial disease indication for far longer than the statute originally intended.”137 
Another tactic is to use ODA to lengthen the normal duration of exclusivity on 
patented drugs. “[M]any companies find new applications for major drugs that 
have been around for a long time and then seek the extension. One example, 
Rituxan, has obtained seven orphan approvals—meaning seven additional 
uses—and now has exclusivity until June 2025.”138 An investigation by Kaiser 
Health News “found that popular mass-market drugs such as cholesterol 
blockbuster Crestor, Abilify for psychiatric conditions, cancer drug Herceptin 
and rheumatoid arthritis drug Humira, the best-selling medicine in the world, 
all won orphan approval yet were already on the market to treat common 
conditions.”139 
By employing tactics like these, manufacturers have generated enormous 
revenues. In 2015, 7 of the 10 drugs that achieved blockbuster status with sales 
exceeding $1 billion were approved as orphans but were then routinely 
prescribed by physicians for off-label uses.140 “Scholars at Johns 
Hopkins estimate that in 2015, revenue from orphan drugs totaled $107 billion, 
representing one-quarter of all U.S. drug revenues []. They project that share to 
approach one-third of drug spending in 2020, representing $176 billion in 
orphan sales.”141 By eliminating marketing exclusivity and rendering 
pharmaceutical companies’ stratagems useless, a prize system could bring 
down drug costs significantly.142 
 
136. Avik Roy, The Competition Prescription: A Market-Based Plan for Affordable 
Drugs, FOUND. FOR RES. ON EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 12 (May 16, 2017), 
https://freopp.docsend.com/view/cfaqar8 [https://perma.cc/MPB4-CDHN].  
137.  Id. 
138.  Erik Sherman, Big Pharma Companies Use Loophole on Old Drugs for New 
Profits, FORTUNE MAG. (Feb. 19, 2019), https://fortune.com/2019/02/19/orphan-drug-loopholes 
[https://perma.cc/2P6J-RBB4]. 
139.  Sarah J. Tribble & Sydney Lupkin, Government Investigation Finds Flaws in the 
FDA’s Orphan Drug Program, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Nov. 30, 2018), 
https://khn.org/news/government-investigation-finds-flaws-in-the-fdas-orphan-drug-program 
[https://perma.cc/U7S8-U88D]; see also Sarah J. Tribble & Sydney Lupkin, Drugmakers Manipulate 
Orphan Drug Rules to Create Prized Monopolies, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Jan. 17, 2017), 
https://khn.org/news/drugmakers-manipulate-orphan-drug-rules-to-create-prized-
monopolies[https://perma.cc/NF5R-7GXR]. 
140.  Michael G. Daniel et al., The Orphan Drug Act: Restoring the Mission to Rare 
Diseases, 39 AM. J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 210, 211 (2016).  
141.  Roy, supra note 136, at 12 (citing Daniel et al., supra note 134, at 211). 
142. We have focused on the ways that pharmaceutical companies have gamed the 
UDI and UDA, but there is no shortage of similar examples of strategic behavior in other contexts (e.g., 
reverse payments, product hopping, authorized generics, Orange Book listings, citizens petitions, and 
the like). As these examples individually and collectively reflect, pharmaceutical companies expertly 
manipulate our regulatory system to extend the functional life of their patents. A prize system would 
eliminate the incentive and opportunity to engage in such behavior. It would also eliminate the need for 
patent-infringement suits by disposing with the patents that are the subject of such litigation.  
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A prize system could also encourage the development of medicines that 
are not needed currently but that would be valuable to have available for a 
possible epidemic. Remdesivir, discussed above, provides an example. 
Remdesivir is a multipurpose antiviral developed to combat dengue fever, West 
Nile virus, Zika, MERS, SARS, and Ebola.143 However, remdesivir was never 
approved by the FDA, apparently because Gilead, the patent holder, saw too 
little financial gain to warrant the cost of applying. Had a prize regime been in 
place, the NIH might have motivated Gilead to perform clinical trials on 
remdesivir’s effectiveness against a variety of coronaviruses. The NIH might 
also have incentivized other drug companies to develop other, more effective 
molecules. From this perspective, the paying-twice critique has some bite. But 
consumers’ second payment is not at the pharmacy counter. Instead, consumers 
pay the opportunity costs of drugs and other treatments that never come to 
market—or come to market too late—because our patent-based system 
provides inadequate incentives to do so. 
The idea of using government-sponsored prizes to spur innovation is an 
old one. The most famous example, memorialized in Dava Sobel’s bestselling 
book Longitude: The True Story of a Lone Genius Who Solved the Great 
Scientific Problem of His Time, is the prize the government of Great Britain 
offered for the development of an instrument that would enable mariners to 
determine their longitude at sea.144 Other instances include the Food 
Preservation Prize, which led to the invention of canning, and the French 
government’s offer of cash to anyone who discovered a cure for Phylloxera, a 
disease that ravaged vineyards.145 Private philanthropies and businesses have 
offered prizes for achieving progress toward a diverse array of goals, including 
“ending human trafficking, reducing American dependency on foreign oil, 
reducing smoking and obesity rates, improving African governance, providing 
clean water in the developing world, inspiring and educating children about 
technology, and improving collaboration among nonprofits.”146 
There is much that can be learned by studying these efforts. Mission-
driven private philanthropies and businesses can resist the efforts of influence-
 
143. See Brown, supra note 133; Lee Fang, Banks Pressure Health Care Firms to 
Raise Prices on Critical Drugs, Medical Supplies for Coronavirus, INTERCEPT (Mar. 19, 2020), 
https://theintercept.com/2020/03/19/coronavirus-vaccine-medical-supplies-price-gouging 
[https://perma.cc/EW34-4HUV]. 
144. DAVA SOBEL, LONGITUDE: THE TRUE STORY OF A LONE GENIUS WHO SOLVED 
THE GREATEST SCIENTIFIC PROBLEM OF HIS TIME (1995).  
145. For a list of prizes of historical interest, their sponsors, and their winners, see 
William A. Masters & Benoit Delbecq, Accelerating Innovation with Prize Rewards: History and 
Typology of Technology Prizes (Int’l Food & Policy Research Inst., IFRI Discussion Paper 00835, 
2008), http://cdm15738.contentdm.oclc.org/utils/getfile/collection/p15738coll2/id/15644/filename/
15645.pdf [https://perma.cc/QW3H-XWQJ]. 
146. “And the Winner Is . . .”: Capturing the Promise of Philanthropic Prizes, 
MCKINSEY & CO. 11-12 (2009), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/
Social%20Sector/Our%20Insights/And%20the%20winner%20is%20Philanthropists%20and%20govern
ments%20make%20prizes%20count/And-the-winner-is-Philanthropists-and-governments-make-prizes-
count.ashx [https://perma.cc/L2C5-NZ87].  
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peddlers more readily than governments and are strongly motivated to design 
prizes that generate desired effects. 
What about prizes for improvements in health care? In medicine, privately 
funded prizes “have been used since the 1800s to incentivize and/or reward 
R&D.”147 Many were offered to stimulate research on treatments for 
tuberculosis. Drugmaker “Eli Lilly developed a program of small prizes to 
address discrete challenges that were part of larger efforts on drug 
development. This was later spun off as InnoCentive, a for-profit entity that 
currently manages hundreds of prize competitions, many of which involve 
biomedical inventions.”148 In addition to tuberculosis, the research areas 
targeted include cancer, sexually transmitted infections, aging, ALS, and 
genome sequencing. 
What about pharmaceuticals? Proposals for a pharmaceutical prize-based 
system have gained traction in recent years. In 2007, Professor Joseph Stiglitz 
floated the idea in a two-page paper.149 Senator Bernie Sanders then proposed a 
bill in 2012 to use prizes, rather than patents, for AIDs drugs.150 In 2017, Ohio 
State Representative Jim Butler advocated for a general prize-based system. He 
“proposed having Ohio take the lead in creating a new multi-state compact that 
would offer billions in cash prizes to those who develop actual cures for major 
diseases.”151 The compact would tie the amount offered for a drug to the money 
that drug saved over a period of years.152 For example, the inventor of a cure 
for Alzheimer’s Disease might receive $12 billion to $25 billion.153 
Ingeniously, Rep. Butler suggested that the money needed to fund the prizes 
should come from the states’ Medicaid programs, which would redirect to 
inventors the money previously spent on services for patients.154 This would 
both eliminate the need for a new appropriation and protect the participating 
states from losses. They would pay out only when they saved money, and the 
amount paid would never exceed the amount saved. 
 
147. Treating Rare and Neglected Pediatric Diseases: Promoting the Development of 
New Treatments and Cures: Hearing on Examining Treating Rare and Neglected Pediatric Diseases, 
Focusing on Promoting the Development of New Treatments and Cures Before the S. Comm. on Health, 
Educ., Labor & Pensions, 111th Cong. 125 (2010) (statement of Suerie Moon, Bd. Member, Doctors 
Without Borders USA). 
148. Id. 
149. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Prizes, Not Patents, 42 POST-AUTISTIC ECON. REV. 46, 46-47 
(2007).  
150. Brian Vastag, ‘Radical’ Bill Seeks to Reduce Cost of AIDS Drugs by Awarding 




151. Jim Siegel, Ohio Lawmaker Wants to Offer Billions for Cure of Cancer, Other 
Major Diseases, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Sept. 12, 2017), 
https://www.dispatch.com/news/20170912/ohio-lawmaker-wants-to-offer-billions-for-cure-of-cancer-
other-major-diseases [https://perma.cc/6ZGS-8257].  
152. Id.  
153. Id.  
154. Id.  
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There is strong support for publicly sponsored prizes. In 1999, the 
National Academy of Engineering “recommended that Congress encourage 
federal agencies to experiment more extensively with inducement prize 
contests in science and technology.”155 Soon thereafter, the Pentagon’s Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency offered a $1 million prize for the 
development of self-driving vehicles.156 NASA picked up the baton in 2005 
and created its Centennial Challenges program, which seeks “to directly engage 
the public in the process of advanced technology development.”157 In 2011, the 
America Competes Reauthorization Act, “which allowed all federal agencies to 
set up challenges,” led to the creation of Challenge.gov. As of 2017, federal 
agencies had established more than 770 competitions, several of which, such as 
those for creating vascular tissue in vitro and for producing an app for reading 
medical records, related to health care.158 
HHS actively sponsors prizes. Between 2011 and 2017, it ran 140 
competitions spawning a variety of inventions, including: 
apps that speed identification of dangerous pathogens or respond to asthma 
attacks, [] wearables that collect health data, and improve[d] patient matching 
through electronic records. The competitions have fostered dozens of new 
companies and partnerships. A Breast Cancer Startup Challenge, funded partly 
by the Avon Foundation and private NGOs, encouraged inventors to develop 
products from the National Institutes of Health’s collection of patents related to 
the disease. Eleven companies have been started as a result. An NIH Debut 
challenge, aimed at firing up undergraduate scientists, led to a prototype device 
for measuring lung function that plugs into a smartphone. . . . The U.S. Agency 
for International Development provided $2 million to its Fighting Ebola Grand 
Challenge, which drew 1,500 proposals and led to development of new 
diagnostics, tracking apps and protective equipment for health workers, 
including cool packs allowing them to comfortably treat Ebola patients while 
wearing hazmat suits.159 
There is plenty of opportunity for new prizes as well. In 2017, the NIH 
announced a $1 million prize for creating a process to grow human retinal 
tissue.160 In 2020, the NIH is running a $100,000 challenge to generate ideas 
for the treatment of Substance Use Disorders.161 
 
155. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., CONCERNING FEDERALLY SPONSORED 
INDUCEMENT PRIZES IN ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE: REPORT OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE FOR THE 
WORKSHOP TO ASSESS THE POTENTIAL FOR PROMOTING TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE THROUGH 
GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED PRIZES AND CONTESTS 1 (1999).  
156. Arthur Allen, Government by Prize, POLITICO (June 8, 2017), 
https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/06/08/federal-government-innovation-challenge-gov-
000450 [https://perma.cc/2S6T-K5Q4]. 
157. Id.  
158. Id. 
159. Id.  
160. Id. 
161. Nat’l Insts. of Health, $100,000 for a Start a SUD Startup Challenge, 2020 
Spring Edition, CHALLENGE.GOV (2020), https://www.challenge.gov/challenge/2020-1000000-start-a-
sud-startup-challenge [https://perma.cc/TWF5-XGN4]. 
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Although we have concentrated in this Article on using prizes for 
pharmaceuticals, these examples show that the potential is far broader and 
could encompass all the areas currently covered by Bayh-Dole. Indeed, a prize 
system has the potential to revolutionize the way public and private funds are 
used across the board, for all types of inventions. Because universities would 
no longer be able to patent discoveries made with public funds, as they have 
since the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, grants funded with tax 
dollars could require open access to all results, thereby eliminating trade-secret 
protections as well. Expensive acquisitions of spinoffs, like Gilead’s $11 billion 
purchase of Pharmasset, would disappear and with them, those acquisitions’ 
effects of driving up drug prices and providing whopping private returns on 
research undertaken with public funds. The change would also facilitate 
cooperation among scientists because there would be little to gain by keeping 
secrets from others. 
Prizes would pick up where grants leave off. With all publicly funded 
basic research in the public domain, private entrepreneurs would be free to take 
advantage of new discoveries when trying to develop the treatments for which 
prizes are on offer. Presumably, prizes would offer lucrative compensation to 
talented researchers who reach the goal before others. But researchers would 
have only their talents to sell, and private entities would bear costs and risks 
associated with the process of turning basic research into marketable drugs. 
Consumers would continue to fund research, but they would buy the resulting 
drugs far more cheaply. 
Careful division of grants from prizes would also prevent researchers and 
pharmaceutical companies from working together to force third parties to carry 
the largest possible share of research costs. Under the current system, grants are 
all upside for the private sector. When experiments fail, they need not return 
the money, and when they succeed, researchers and drug companies can patent 
the discoveries. Even if we move to a prize system, researchers and 
pharmaceutical companies will have every incentive to milk the grant system 
for additional support. To address their use of “heads I win, tails you lose” 
strategies, grants and prizes would have to be coordinated. 
Making a single government agency responsible for both grants and prizes 
would facilitate coordination. The NIH is the obvious candidate. It already 
sponsors both grants and prizes and has ready access to the information 
necessary for deciding which prizes to offer and how large they should be. 
Deciding which prizes to offer, fixing their amounts, defining their conditions, 
and evaluating success are complicated tasks requiring experts’ informed 
judgments. For present purposes, though, the important point is that a prize 
regime could eliminate the concern that the prices charged for new medications 
compensate drug companies for costs and risks that taxpayers bore by funding 
relevant research. Prizes would be the only source of remuneration for 
inventors. Consequently, the burden of avoiding overcompensation would fall 
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to the agency charged with fixing the amount of the prize. All such decisions 
would be public—and paid out of the public fisc. 
Because prizes would be funded with taxpayers’ dollars, it is an open 
question whether the public’s total financial contribution to drug development 
and consumption would fall if the patent system for pharmaceuticals was 
replaced. Although the likely answer is yes, the matter is too complicated to be 
resolved here. One must know, for example, how many prizes will be offered 
and how large they will be.162 One must also attach dollar values to the 
deadweight losses that patents produce and reduce the cost of prizes 
accordingly. Finally, one would have to compare drug prices under the two 
regimes and decide how to account for the fact that a prize system makes the 
cost of pharmaceutical R&D the responsibility of the taxpayers, while our 
current patent-based system forces patients and their insurers (both public and 
private) to foot the bill. These matters require sophisticated assessments that 
have yet to be made and would be based on data that are not readily available. 
That observation points to a final—but larger—problem. As with most 
areas of law and policy, we don’t have the data to evaluate fully the 
consequences of abandoning the Bayh-Dole regime in favor of plausible 
alternatives. With a modest amount of work, anyone with an internet 
connection can figure out how much we are spending on federal funding of 
research and development. But it is much more difficult to figure out the 
returns on those expenditures. Is Bayh-Dole still a good deal for the taxpaying 
 
162. Even if we constitute an expert body to set the prizes, we should anticipate that 
they will make mistakes, sometimes offering too much and other times not offering enough. And the 
criteria for obtaining the prize will sometimes be too lax and other times too strict. All these targets will 
be set based on an assessment of the value of drug innovation (both in general and in particular areas), 
which are all highly contested judgments. If these decisions are left to the political process, there will be 
different (and likely additional) complications and error costs. Of course, hindsight is 20/20, but the 
reality is that we are dealing with comparative institutional imperfection. To believe otherwise is to 
indulge in the nirvana fallacy. See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 
J.L. ECON. 1, 1 (1969) (“The view that now pervades much public policy economics implicitly presents 
the relevant choice as between an ideal norm and an existing ‘imperfect’ institutional arrangement. This 
nirvana approach differs considerably from a comparative institution approach in which the relevant 
choice is between alternative real institutional arrangements.”).  
For those who want more concrete evidence on the difficulties with relying on experts, we have a 
one-word response: COVID-19. For those who prefer citations to the literature, we suggest Nicola 
Davis, Report on Face Masks’ Effectiveness for Covid-19 Divides Scientists, GUARDIAN (May 4, 2020), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/04/scientists-disagree-over-face-masks-effect-on-covid-
19 [https://perma.cc/4UJ6-RKCU] (discussing disagreement among scientists regarding the efficacy of 
face coverings in preventing the spread of disease); John P.A. Ioannidis, Sally Cripps & Martin A. 
Tanner, Forecasting for COVID-19 has Failed, INT’L INSTITUTE FORECASTERS (June 14, 2020), 
https://forecasters.org/blog/2020/06/14/forecasting-for-covid-19-has-failed [https://perma.cc/47NX-
R2DP] (“[D]espite involving many excellent modelers, best intentions, and highly sophisticated tools, 
forecasting efforts have largely failed. . . . Failure in epidemic forecasting is an old problem. In fact, it is 
surprising that epidemic forecasting has retained much credibility among decision-makers, given its 
dubious track record.”); and Liz Essley Whyte, Scientists Say New, Lower CDC Estimates of COVID-19 
Severity Are Optimistic, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 22, 2020), 
https://publicintegrity.org/health/coronavirus-and-inequality/scientists-say-new-lower-cdc-estimates-of-
covid-19s-severity-are-optimistic [https://perma.cc/3247-8JAM] (discussing changes over time in the 
CDC’s “best-guess” estimates of the number of deaths from COVID-19 and disagreements among 
experts concerning the accuracy of its predictions). 
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public? Without the necessary data, we have no idea. It is an old joke that the 
invariant finding of all studies is the need for more studies,163 but in this 
instance, that observation happens to be right. 
Conclusion 
The paying-twice critique is simultaneously far more complex and far less 
compelling than its proponents have acknowledged. Some publicly funded 
research is basic research that qualifies as true public goods. Other publicly 
funded research does not involve public goods, but even here the relative 
contribution of all parties (including the risks that each one bears) must be 
considered. Given these dynamics and past unhappy experiences with 
regulatory price setting, it is wholly implausible that the efficient solution to 
this complex problem is to require reasonable pricing for all comers. 
That is not to say that all is well with the pharmaceutical market, for 
reasons that go well beyond the paying-twice problem. However, if we want to 
address the paying-twice problem, the obvious solution is to require the 
payment of a royalty reflecting the contribution of publicly funded research to 
the drug in question, with the precise details varying depending on the nature of 
those contributions and the risks borne by each of the parties.164 
For those who favor more radical strategies, we argue in Overcharged that 
given our flawed patent and payment systems, even a flawed prize system is 
likely to do better.165 “You pays your money and takes your choice.”166 
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166. William Safire, On Language; You Pays Yer Money, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 1988), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/28/magazine/on-language-you-pays-yer-money.html 
[https://perma.cc/UW4U-DHBM].  
